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Paying health workers for performance in
Battagram district, Pakistan
Sophie Witter1,2*, Tehzeeb Zulfiqur3, Sarah Javeed4, Amanullah Khan5 and Abdul Bari6
Abstract
Background: There is a growing interest in using pay-for-performance mechanisms in low and middle-income
countries in order to improve the performance of health care providers. However, at present there is a dearth of
independent evaluations of such approaches which can guide understanding of their potential and risks in
differing contexts. This article presents the results of an evaluation of a project managed by an international non-
governmental organisation in one district of Pakistan. It aims to contribute to learning about the design and
implementation of pay-for-performance systems and their impact on health worker motivation.
Methods: Quantitative analysis was conducted of health management information system (HMIS) data, financial
records, and project documents covering the period 2007-2010. Key informant interviews were carried out with
stakeholders at all levels. At facility level, in-depth interviews were held, as were focus group discussions with staff
and community members.
Results: The wider project in Battagram had contributed to rebuilding district health services at a cost of less than
US$4.5 per capita and achieved growth in outputs. Staff, managers and clients were appreciative of the gains in
availability and quality of services. However, the role that the performance-based incentive (PBI) component played
was less clear–PBI formed a relatively small component of pay, and did not increase in line with outputs. There
was little evidence from interviews and data that the conditional element of the PBIs influenced behaviour. They
were appreciated as a top-up to pay, but remained low in relative terms, and only slightly and indirectly related to
individual performance. Moreover, they were implemented independently of the wider health system and
presented a clear challenge for longer term integration and sustainability.
Conclusions: Challenges for performance-based pay approaches include the balance of rewarding individual
versus team efforts; reflecting process and outcome indicators; judging the right level of incentives; allowing for
very different starting points and situations; designing a system which is simple enough for participants to
comprehend; and the tension between independent monitoring and integration in a national system. Further
documentation of process and cost-effectiveness, and careful examination of the wider impacts of paying for
performance, are still needed.
Background
Improving the performance of health care delivery sys-
tems is an important objective, both in high-income set-
tings but even more critically in low- and middle-
income settings, where resources for health are much
more constrained.
Pay-for-performance is currently receiving increased
attention as a strategy for improving the performance
of healthcare providers, organisations and
governments. It is also promoted as an important tool
for achieving the health Millennium Development
Goals, and for improving the effectiveness of develop-
ment aid. However, there is currently a lack of rigor-
ous evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in
improving health care and health, particularly in lower
income countries [Witter et al, Paying providers for
performance in health care in low and middle income
countries: a systematic review, submitted to Cochrane
Collaboration, 2011; [1,2]].
Pay-for-performance refers to the transfer of money or
material goods conditional on taking a measurable
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action or achieving a predetermined performance target
[3]. While paying for performance is relatively a simple
concept, it includes a wide range of interventions that
vary with respect to the level at which the incentives are
targeted (recipients of healthcare, individual providers of
healthcare, health care facilities, private sector organiza-
tions, public sector organizations and national or sub-
national levels). The types of outputs or outcomes targeted
can also vary widely, as can the type of accompanying
measures (such as investments in training, equipment and
overall resources).
In OECD countries, paying for performance is gener-
ally described as a tool for improving quality [4]. In low
and middle income countries, however, it generally has
wider objectives [Witter et al, Paying providers for per-
formance in health care in low and middle income
countries: a systematic review, submitted to Cochrane
Collaboration, 2011], including:
• to increase the allocation efficiency of health ser-
vices (by encouraging the provision of high priority
and cost effective services)
• to increase the technical efficiency (by making bet-
ter use of existing resources such as health staff)
• to improve equity of outcomes (for example, by
encouraging expansion of services to hard-to-reach
groups)
Independent evaluations of pay-for-performance
schemes–their design, implementation and cost-effec-
tiveness–are important to inform the policy debate
about the different modalities of paying for performance
and their likely contribution in different contexts. They
also contribute to the wider discussion of the relative
role of financial and non-financial incentives in motivat-
ing health worker [6,7].
This article aims to contribute to published experi-
ences of paying providers for performance in low-
income settings, based on an independent review of a
district-based pay-for-performance health project in
Pakistan.
The project
Save the Children US (SC US) started working in Batta-
gram district, North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan,
after the earthquake of 8 October 2005. Battagram has a
total land area of 1301 square kilometres. The estimated
population of Battagram in 2004-2005 was 361 000,
with 277 inhabitants per square kilometre. In April
2008, following the initial emergency and relief phase,
SC US entered a public-private partnership to revitalise
primary health care in the district through reconstruc-
tion, equipment, provision of supplies, management
support and training.
The project was funded by the World Bank and Japan
International Cooperation Agency with an overall bud-
get of just under $3 million. It was planned for a period
of two years, ending in June 2010.
The district health system in Pakistan is composed of
two tiers of public healthcare facilities. The primary
health care services are provided at dispensaries, basic
health units (BHUs) and rural health centres (RHCs).
Secondary care–including first and second referral facil-
ities providing acute, ambulatory and inpatient care–are
provided through Tehsil and district headquarter hospi-
tals (DHQs). An important feature of the project was
that the provincial government agreed to transfer the
district health budget to the Save the Children account.
Save the Children was authorized to organize and man-
age the healthcare services (including human resource
management, and maintenance of health facilities); pro-
cure and supply medicines; implement the health man-
agement information system; and monitor and supervise
the health system in Battagram.
As part of project implementation the district was
divided into four ‘hubs’, centred around the rural health
centres. The hub centres acted as referral facilities for
the attached basic health centres, civil dispensaries,
maternal and child health centres and tuberculosis con-
trol centres located in their catchment areas. The hubs’
centres were provided with adequate staff and services,
including basic emergency obstetric and newborn care
and 24-hour emergency services. All the hub centres
were equipped with an ambulance. Staff were hired to
fill the vacant sanctioned posts (funded from the district
health budget), and additional staff were hired, paid
from project funds.
In addition, from July 2008, Save the Children started
a performance-based incentive (PBI) scheme, whereby
all government-employed health facility workers were
entitled to receive an additional 20-35% of their pay,
according to performance criteria.
Staff hired directly by SC US were not entitled to
incentives, but were paid a higher basic salary (43 staff
were hired directly by SC US during the project life-
time–some 13% of the health workforce of the district).
The PBI component was designed around two mea-
surement tools–one is a supervisory checklist, which
was filled each month by an independent monitor (often
from SC US), who checked on qualitative issues such as
the hygiene of the facility, functionality of equipment,
and maintenance of registers (see Table 1). The second
was a set of targets set for preventive services, including
coverage of antenatal care, deliveries by skilled birth
attendants, post-natal care, newborn weighing, growth
monitoring for under-threes, and three immunisation
indicators (second maternal tetanus toxoid immuniza-
tion (TT2) completed, infant immunisation started and
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immunisation completed). These were scored using
information from the health management information
system (HMIS). Table 2 illustrates how points were
awarded in relation to these activities. Staff attendance
records were also monitored.
An overall weight of 40% was given to the 27 quali-
tative indicators and 60% to the 8 quantitative.
According to the combined score reached, staff
received a monthly supplement to basic pay of 20-35%,
paid to all staff on the government payroll (which was
managed in the district by SC US during the project
duration). An average of 323 (between 320 and 415)
health workers received performance based incentives
over the project lifetime, paid direct into their bank
accounts monthly.
As the project drew to a close in 2010, Save the
Children US commissioned a review of the project, with
particular emphasis on the PBI component.
Table 1 Supervision checklist and scorecard
S. No Activity/Task Observation Total
obtained
1 Centre functional Open (5) Closed (0) 5
2 Out-look
of the Centre
Poor (0) Satisfactory (1)
Good (2) Excellent (3)
3
3 Cleanliness
of the centre
I/C room (1) Pt. Waiting Area (1)
LHV room(1) EPI room (1)
Store (1)
5
4 Staff uniform Yes (1) No (0) 1
5 Necessary information display I/C (1) LHV (1)
EPI (1)
3
6 Attendance register maintained Yes (2) No (0) 2
7 Staff leave record maintained Yes (1) No (0) 1
8 Absent staff report submitted Yes No If not, state reason
9 Sufficient office furniture Available Not available If not, state reason
10 Diagnostic set Available Not available If not, state reason
11 Registers HMIS maintained OPD (1) EPI (1)
Mother health (1) Child health (1)
Birth register (1) Family planning (1)
Stock register(1) Medicines register (1)
8
12 OPD tickets
(properly used)
Yes (1) No (0) 1
13 Last month HMIS report Complete (1) Incomplete (0) 1
14 DEWS reports Submitted (1) Not submitted (0) 1
15 Monthly staff meeting held Yes (1) No (0) 1
16 Cold chain equipments Functional Non-functional If not, state reason
17 Vaccine availability Available Not available If not, state reason
18 Vaccine
properly placed
Yes (1) No (0) 1
19 EPI Tech. following Monthly Tour Program Yes (1) No (0) 1
20 EPI motor-cycle
Log-book Maintained
Yes (1) No (0) 1
21 Delivery table
available & clean
Yes (1) No (0) 1
22 Delivery kit
available & clean
Yes (1) No (0) 1
23 Baby weighing machine available & functional Yes No If not, state reason
24 Physical Store verification Correct (1 No (0) 2
25 Bin cards display Yes No 1
26 X-ray Functional Non-functional If not, state reason
27 Laboratory Functional Non-functional If not, state reason
Total 40
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Methods
A mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods
was used. Question guides were prepared for all of the
qualitative research. For the quantitative, a framework of
indicators guided the analysis.
The review was carried out in June 2010. Quantitative
analysis was conducted of health management informa-
tion system (HMIS) data, financial records, monthly
progress reports, records of supervisory and perfor-
mance scores of facilities, and project documents cover-
ing the period 2007 - mid-2010. In addition, eleven key
informant interviews were carried out with stakeholders
at SC US, the World Bank, provincial and district
offices, and one local association.
The health facilities were chosen to represent the four
hub areas, but also the stratification of performance: one
was chosen from each of categories (very good, good,
satisfactory and poor). At facility level, in-depth inter-
views were held with seven managers and other staff
working at four facilities (three basic health units and
one rural health centre). Eleven focus group discussions
with staff (male and female) and community members
(male and female) were also held. Data was collected by
a team of three field researchers, together with the
Table 2 Performance assessment formula
PL registered for ANC
Target Achievement % Score
Expected pregnancies
Catchment population/270
PL registered for ANC Achievement/target
x100
total = 10
IF > = 70,"10”, IF > = 51,"8”, IF > = 41,"6”, IF > = 36,"4”,
IF > = 31,"3”, IF > = 26,"2”, IF > = 20,"1”, IF < 20="0”
PL completed TT2
Target Achievement % score
Expected pregnancies
catchment population/270
PL completed TT2 Achievement/target
× 100
Total = 8
IF > = 60,"8”, IF > = 51,"6”, IF > = 41,"5”, IF > = 36,"4”,
IF > = 31,"3”, IF > = 26,"2”, IF > = 20,"1”, IF < 20="0”
Deliveries by skilled birth attendants
Target Achievement % Score
Expected deliveries
catchment population/300
Deliveries by skilled birth
attendants
Achievement/target
× 100
Total = 10
IF > = 60,"10”, IF > = 51,"8”, IF > = 41,"6”, IF > = 36,"4”,
IF > = 31,"3”, IF > = 26,"2”, IF > = 20,"1”, IF < 20="0”
Newborn weighed
Target Achievement % Score
Total births
catchment population/300
Newborn weighed Achievement/target
× 100
Total = 6
IF > = 60,"6”, IF > = 55,"5”, IF > = 46,"4”, IF > = 38,"3”,
IF > = 30,"2”, IF > = 20,1, IF < 20,"0”
Post natal visits
Target Achievement % Score
Deliveries in last month Postnatal visits Achievement/target
× 100
Total = 6
IF > = 60,"6”, IF > = 55,"5”, IF > = 46,"4”, IF > = 38,"3”,
IF > = 30,"2”, IF > = 20,1, IF < 20,"0”
Infants started immunization
Target Achievement % Score
Infants in population
3.5/100 × patchment
population
Infants started immunization Achievement/target
× 100
Total = 6
IF > = 81,"6”, IF > = 65,"5”, IF > = 50,"4”, IF > = 35,"3”,
IF > = 20,2, IF < 20,"0”
Infants completed immunization
Target Achievement % Score
3.5/100 × Catchment
population/12
Infants completed
immunization
Achievement/Target
× 100
Total = 8
IF > = 81,"8”, IF > = 71,"7”, IF > = 61,"6”, IF > = 51,"5”,
IF > = 41,"4”, IF > = 31,"3”, IF > = 20,2, IF < 20,"0”
Children < 3 weighed for growth monitoring
Target Achievement % Score
11/100× Catchment
Population/12
Children < 3 years weighed
for GM
Achievement/Target
× 100
Total = 6
IF > = 60,"6”, IF > = 55,"5”, IF > = 46,"4”, IF > = 38,"3”,
IF > = 30,"2”, IF > = 20,1, IF < 20,"0”
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OPM consultant, while SC US provided one of their
team members as a facilitator.
Analysis of quantitative data was undertaken using
Excel. Qualitative reports were analysed thematically.
The calculation of the performance indicators and of
incentives changed after the first two months. Therefore
the analysis omitted these two months so as not to bias
trends, and covered July 2008-April 2010.
Results
The findings are structured by a set of eight questions
which should be asked of all pay-for-performance
approaches. The first relates to design, and whether the
targeted indicators were the right ones. Next we con-
sider whether the system was well implemented. The
third question is whether payments were in practice
responsive to performance variation across the facilities.
Fourth, did the payments motivate staff to change their
behaviour, as was their primary goal? The fifth question
is whether the approach was acceptable to the main
local stakeholders. We then consider the core question
of whether the PBI component improved overall perfor-
mance of the health system. Evidence of possible per-
verse effects is also considered. Finally, we discuss the
sustainability of the project.
Did the PBI reward the right targets?
In terms of design, the use of two different scoring
methods–one based broadly on ‘process factors’, which
staff can directly influence (such as the cleanliness of
the facility), and the other based on outputs, which are
important but can only be partly influenced by supply-
side actions–was seen by evaluators to represent a good
balance. Average scores were higher for the supervision
scores (73%) than the performance ones (46%), as per-
formance indicators are ‘stickier’ and change more
slowly (especially skilled deliveries, which are affected by
important community beliefs, as well as cost and other
access barriers). Differential thresholds for targets
allowed for the fact that some indicators (e.g. ANC)
started at much higher levels than others (e.g. facility
deliveries).
The two scores were correlated, as would be
expected–generally, facilities with higher average super-
vision scores also had higher average performance
scores, although the range was much greater for the lat-
ter (5%-48%), while supervision only spanned 20%-37%
(see Figure 1).
Was the PBI monitoring system well implemented?
The PBI component relied on monthly assessment by an
independent monitor (often a SC US representative),
based on observation and the facility registers. The pro-
cess for measuring performance appears to have been
reasonably regular for the Basic Health Units and Rural
Health Centres, although there were months in which
no assessment was made (and facilities received an auto-
matic score, with staff receiving 20% incentives, which
clearly undermines the approach). The average number
of months for which supervisions were missed, per facil-
ity over the project lifetime, was 1.5, but for some facil-
ities it was around one in three (10-12 months missed
out of 30). The reasons given for missing supervision
were either that the facility was under construction or
that management attention was taken up for some
major activity elsewhere. There were also some discre-
pancies between the overall score reached and the level
of incentive paid, but these were limited.
The system worked less well for the civil dispensaries.
All of the civil dispensaries scored less than 20 on the
supervisory scores. The incentive paid to its staff never
exceeded 20%. In addition, from the records it seems
that the CDs were not visited regularly as part of the
supervision and monitoring.
For the performance scores there was no independent
verification of data taken from the facility registers.
Were the PBI sufficiently responsive to changes in
performance?
A successful PBI scheme (one which motivates indivi-
duals and teams) would be expected to produce posi-
tive trends in performance scores and positive trends
in incentives. A change in ranking of individual facil-
ities might also be expected over time, as facilities
respond differentially to incentives. In Battagram, the
supervision score component actually fell by 1 point
(or -3%), reflecting its high starting point, while the
performance score increased by 9 points (or 36%).
However, the overall incentive score rose only by 2
points (7%) over the life of the project (comparing the
first six months with the last six months), and pay-
ments to individual staff did not increase on average
over time. This suggests that the overall project has
been effective but that the link with the performance
measurement system and incentives was weak. Some
of the possible reasons for this are discussed in the
section on motivation below.
On average, no facilities were graded as poor, and
two-thirds fell within the incentive of 30%-35% band
(see Figure 2), suggesting that the scale was not suffi-
ciently sensitive (or that all facilities are really achiev-
ing on the same high level). Moreover facilities
maintained more or less their position in relation to
the starting point, and moved in synchronised patterns
(see Figure 3). Those with higher performance at the
start appear to have made more progress over time
than those lower down. This indicates that prior fea-
tures (either features relating to the services or to
Witter et al. Human Resources for Health 2011, 9:23
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/9/1/23
Page 5 of 12
010
20
30
40
50
60
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
Supervision 
and 
monitoring (% 
scores)
Performance 
indicators (% 
scores)
Figure 1 Average performance and supervision scores, selected facilities, average for 2008-10.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
BH
U
Sa
id
ra
B
ila
nd
Ko
t
BH
U
G
ar
iN
aw
ab
Sa
id
BH
U
Ka
th
or
a
BH
U
Kh
ar
ar
i
BH
U
B
ar
ac
ha
r
BH
U
Ku
zt
an
do
l
BH
U
Sa
ka
rg
ah

BH
U
Ta
lo
os

BH
U
Pa
as
ht
o
BH
U
B
at
ee
la

BH
U
B
ia
ri

BH
U
H
ot
al
Ka
na
i(
Ba
tk
oo
l)
BH
U
Jo
z
BH
U
R
oo
p
Ka
ni

BH
U
Py
m
al
Sh
rif

BH
U
B
at
le
y
BH
U
Sh
am
la
i
BH
U
B
at
am
or
i
BH
U
Ja
m
be
ra

BH
U
Pa
go
ra

BH
U
B
ha
tt
ia
n
BH
U
Ka
na
i
RH
C 
Ku
za
B
an
da

RH
C
Ba
nn
a
BH
U
A
rg
as
ho
ri
BH
U
Kh
ai
ra
ba
d
BH
U
Sh
un
gl
iP
ye
en

BH
U
R
as
ha
ng

BH
U
Ch
ar
ba
gh

CH
Th
ak
ot
A
ve
ra
ge
to
ta
ls
co
re
(c
om
po
si
te
o
fs
up
er
vi
si
on
an
d
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
)
Supervisionandmonitoring Performanceindicators Above70%=verygood
Above46%=Good Above20%=satisfactory
Figure 2 Average total score for each basic health unit and rural health center (September 2008 - April 2010).
Witter et al. Human Resources for Health 2011, 9:23
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/9/1/23
Page 6 of 12
external factors such as the communities served) may
have determined their performance.
Did the PBI motivate health workers?
The structure of the incentives raises some questions in
relation to their effectiveness in motivating higher perfor-
mance. Under the current system, staff in a facility scor-
ing a combined score of 0 would still receive an incentive
of 20%. (Being absent without prior knowledge of the
facility in charge was the only way to fail to achieve 20%.)
In order to receive the additional 15%, their overall score
would need to rise to 70% and above (see Table 3).
Would that effort be justified? Interviews with staff sug-
gested some scepticism, especially when the opportunity
costs (no private practice) were considered. The govern-
ment-hired senior staff lamented the fact that they were
now not permitted to do private practice after work
hours (which were 8 am to 2 pm). There was a general
consensus amongst the facility staff that the incentives
were not sufficient to cover the amount they had pre-
viously been making through private practice.
Many staff were not aware of the detail of how the
incentives were calculated. They were seen as a reflection
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Figure 3 Facility incentive scores, by month (September 2008 - March 2010).
Table 3 Scoring for payment of incentives and the
percentage incentive paid
Score Ranking Incentive
> 70% Very good 35
46 to 70 Good 30
20 to 45 Satisfactory 25
< 20 Poor 20
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of overall facility performance, rather than individual
performance.
“I have no idea about any incentives. I only know that
my salary has increased because I work hard.” (Lady
Health Visitor)
The average incentive paid was 29% of basic pay, and
there was not much variation over time. In relation to
gross pay, however, the proportion was lower–16% on
average–and lower at basic health unit level (13%). This
was commented on by staff, who requested a higher
level of incentive (they suggested 50-100% of basic pay).
Some staff–those in district administration and in the
TB centres–were paid incentives at a ‘fixed rate’ of 35%,
while those hired by SC US direct were offered higher
salaries and were not included in the PBI, although their
performance was included in the overall rating of the
facility. There was a general lack of understanding and
transparency between these groups about each other’s
incentives and salary scales. The salary scale of the SC
US staff was substantially higher than the government-
hired staff–roughly equivalent to the government staff
after the addition of 35% incentives, but both groups
seemed unaware of this.
In absolute terms, PBI ranged from $15 per month for
the lowest paid worker to $172 for the highest (the dis-
trict director and deputy director of health). The average
paid in monthly incentives was $48 per person.
Were PBI acceptable to stakeholders?
Staff perception of PBI was positive–importantly, it was
seen as being objective and as rewarding the perfor-
mance of the whole facility. The fact that payments
were made directly into staff bank accounts, and were
proportionate to income, removed the element of indivi-
dual discretion that can prove very corrosive in perfor-
mance management schemes.
There were, however, some concerns in relation to
equity–the main one related to the different treatment
of staff hired by SC US, who were on a higher pay-scale
and not included in the PBI scheme. The motivation
behind this different treatment is not clear, but it does
suggest that the PBI were being used primarily as a sal-
ary top-up for public servants.
Stakeholder feedback was positive about the project as
a whole–communities particularly appreciated the low
cost of services and the improvements to supply, includ-
ing the availability of staff and medicines, and improve-
ments in quality and appearance of the facilities. District
and provincial managers were positive but were
concerned about the longer term sustainability of the
approach and how to eventually integrate it back
into the system. Recommendations from the three main
stakeholder groups included putting more emphasis on
community-based activities, developing a closer relationship
with the district and provincial authorities, particularly in
relation to handing over the project, and providing more
detailed feedback to staff on their performance, including
discussion of how to improve it.
Did the PBI improve performance?
The review concluded that the project as a whole had
contributed to an increase in the functionality of the
health system and its outputs, as indicated by the inter-
views with staff and clients and also by the trends in
specific services. Deliveries with skilled birth attendants,
for example, increased by 150% between July 2008 and
April 2010 (see Figure 4). Immunisation, while more
variable month-by-month, still increased by 89% at basic
health unit level, comparing the first six months of the
project with the last six months. At rural health centres
there was a reduction over the project lifetime–however,
if this represents services shifting to the primary level,
then that is an appropriate switch. Analysis of the teta-
nus typhoid uptake supports the view that users have
been enabled to seek immunisation services at lower
level facilities.
Comparison with district HMIS data from 2007 shows
a substantial improvement in all indicators (see Table
4), with monthly outpatient visits, for example, increas-
ing by more than 300% over the period.
Robust attribution to the project requires longer term
trend analysis, which was not undertaken as part of the
review. However, comparing the multiple indicator clus-
ter survey of 2001 with that of 2008, it can be seen that
deliveries with skilled birth attendants had risen signifi-
cantly at district and provincial level by the time of the
introduction of the project, from 14% to 40.5% in Batta-
gram and from 28% to 41% in the province as a whole.
There are no comparable data for the other indicators.
Whether the increases can be attributed to the PBI
component is in any case contentious. The PBIs repre-
sented 24% of the total project expenditure, and were
accompanied by considerable additional investments in
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centres from July 2008-April 2010, Battagram district.
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salaries, infrastructure, training, equipment and manage-
ment support. The project as a whole ensured that there
were adequate facility staff (including female medical
officers), 24-hour emergency services, more equipment
in the facilities (radiology and ultrasound), and a full
range of immunisation, reproductive health and family
planning services. Addressing the issue of costs to users,
the ambulance service was provided free, as were medi-
cines (which are now reliably stocked), delivery services
(pre- and post-natal services), and the nutrition
programme for under-fives and their mothers.
The case studies of individual facilities suggest that
general investments in staffing and upgrading facilities
were the main factors behind improved service delivery.
Individual facilities show great fluctuations over time in
performance scores, in particular, which are commonly
linked with the availability (or absence) of key staff,
such as doctors and nurses. The regular visits by the
monitoring team could also have had a positive effect
for some facility staff. The evaluations of the National
Programme for Family Planning and Primary Health
Care (2001 and 2008) found that regular visits by the
supervisors where they carried out monitoring duties
and the provision of supplies increased performance of
lady health workers, as did continuing education.
Did PBI cause any perverse effects?
A common concern with PBI-type approaches is that a
focus on one set of indicators (in this case, preventive
services) will squeeze out others. Analysis of total OPD
visits over the project period reveal that utilisation rates
rose from 0.42 per person per year (based on the first
four months of the project) to 0.51 per person for the
last four months. This is a rise of 22%, which is substan-
tial, although still well below the WHO norm of 2 OPD
visits per person per year. At the RHC level, the increase
was from 1.13 to 1.85 per person per year - an increase
of 63%. This suggests that in this respect at least, there
were no perverse effects. There were however tensions
created amongst staff in relation to the two different
payment systems (one group receiving incentives, the
other not), which reduced the motivation associated
with the scheme.
Sustainability of the approach
The project as a whole cost 184% of the district health
expenditure, while the PBI element on its own was
equivalent to 44% of the district health expenditure (see
Table 5). Although the cost of the PBI element is low in
USD per capita terms (USD 0.68 per person in the dis-
trict per year), it is nevertheless high compared to the
public spending of $1.65. The costs of the external mon-
itoring which is required to support the PBI system have
not been isolated but would also prove a barrier in scal-
ing up or replicating this project. Stakeholders also
expressed concerns about the sustainability of the pro-
ject, given financial, managerial and organisational con-
straints in the public health sector.
Discussion
The findings on this project raise issues which are speci-
fic to its design, implementation and context, but also
broader reflections on some of the challenges of using
pay-for-performance approaches.
It is generally accepted that professionals are moti-
vated by the satisfaction of doing their jobs well (intrin-
sic motivation). Indeed, it is doubtful whether some
valued-but-difficult- to-observe dimensions of quality
(such as empathy or listening in the medical encounter)
would be provided at all if physicians were solely inter-
ested in income. Thus, professionals have both non-
monetary (that is, personal ethics, professional norms,
regulatory control, clinical uncertainty) and monetary
(from the payment system) incentives, all of which affect
effort. It is possible that financial incentives may dilute
professionals’ intrinsic motivation. On the other hand,
where health workers’ pay is low in absolute terms,
incentives may be an important channel to improve
motivation through increasing their income levels. The
effects of incentives on health worker motivation have
been found to be very context-dependent in previous
studies [5].
Table 4 Trends in output indicators, 2007-10
2007 2008 2009 2010 Percentage increase 2007-10
Average monthly outpatient visits 7029 20 568 33 550 28 274 302
Number registered for antenatal care 451 838 1223 1192 164
Number completed TT2 immunization 137 414 521 537 292
Deliveries assisted by skilled birth attendants 32 189 363 433 1252
Number of newborns weighed 1 124 301 414 41 250
Infants started immunization 1205 552 1014 1808 50
Children fully immunized 128 922 793 1692 1222
Family planning users 56 306 446 535 854
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In the SC US project, the design does suggest that the
PBI component was mainly functioning as a salary top-
up, albeit with the need for staff to be physically present
at facilities. In addition to basic salary came the basic
incentives of 20%. The only margin for gain was the dis-
cretionary 15%, which was linked to general facility per-
formance through a complex measurement system
which most staff did not understand. The likelihood of
individual motivation was therefore low, and most of
the gains are likely to have come from general invest-
ments and the healthy balance of supply- and demand-
side interventions which the project supported.
Paying for outputs (rather than for a composite index
of quality measures and coverage targets) might have
generated stronger incentives, though the risk of perverse
effects might have been commensurately greater. These
perverse effects might include neglecting unrewarded
activities, distorting reporting systems to inflate coverage
and staff moving to areas with higher performance or
more favourable conditions for meeting targets.
One aim of paying for performance can be to encou-
rage entrepreneurial behaviour amongst staff and man-
agers. In this case, there was limited evidence of this,
perhaps in part due to the low awareness by many staff
members of exactly how the PBI scheme functioned.
The existence of two tiers of staff–those hired directly
by the NGO on higher salaries, and those on govern-
ment staff with lower salaries but paid incentives–may
also have weakened any motivational effects of the PBIs.
There is no consensus on how much PBI schemes
should offer, in terms of additional resources, in order
to motivate effectively. Clearly the level has to be set in
context. However, in this case, the additional pay was
below the opportunity costs in terms of private practice
income foregone. In a tightly controlled project, it may
be possible to ensure attendance and prevent staff from
undertaking additional private practice, but in a less well
managed environment, a low level of PBI might not fully
achieve either goal. In other projects, where payment is
made per output, the effectiveness of paying for perfor-
mance has been linked to the payment per output, the
effort required to deliver the output and the extent to
which outputs are responsive to consumer versus provi-
der decisions [6].
One challenge is the difficulty of designing a scheme
which is complex enough to balance process and output
measures, and to include a range of indicators to ensure
that the system is not unduly focussed on a few inter-
ventions, and yet to be comprehensible to participants.
The SC US project performed well in terms of design
but less well in terms of simplicity. This will be a ten-
sion for all PBI processes. The weighting of the different
indicators also involves a difficult judgement call, which
in this case appeared to be made by the external agency
alone, without much involvement of other stakeholders.
Another tension is that of rewarding team work versus
the individual. In the case of this project, the measure-
ment of performance focussed on team outputs, award-
ing the same incentives for all staff in a given facility,
which was more acceptable, and yet pay went directly to
individuals. This was appropriate for the setting and
reduced tensions. The only individually assessed indica-
tor was absenteeism–any member of staff absent with-
out permission during the month was not eligible for
incentives, which may have controlled the tendency to
free-ride.
The review also supports wider evidence that there
can be strongly demotivating effects where incentives
are applied but not to all workers, so that there at least
appear to be winners and losers. This reinforces the
need for incentive strategies and combinations of incen-
tives, rather than narrow incentives.
Another challenge is that individuals and facilities
start at different levels of performance. This can be
managed by setting individual targets, but these would
have to be constantly adjusted in order to keep up with
trends in performance, and ultimately high performers
would be penalised for their more limited potential
gains. In this case, targets were fixed for the group as a
whole, which meant that certain facilities earned more
from start to finish. Where this is linked to effort, this
result would be seen as fair. However, it is more likely
that the initial staffing position and other fixed factors
determined facilities’ performance.
It should also be noted that performance (in terms of
coverage indicators) was assessed using facility data,
which is amenable to manipulation, and was not inde-
pendently verified or corroborated.
Table 5 Total expenditure on project and on PBI (USD), Battagram district
Total expenditure
2008-2010
Expenditure for one
year
Per capita per annum
spend
Ratio of project to government
expenditure
Overall project 2 095 297 838 119 2.88 1.84
PBI component 497 103 198 841 0.68 0.44
Public expenditure on health
in district
1 205 671 482 268 1.65
Total 3 233 333 1 293 333 4.45
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It is interesting that feedback from staff included the
desire for more discussion of performance. A PBI
approach might suggest that staff were already getting
feedback in a very direct way, but in fact, the periodic
checking of registers by an independent monitor, who
then left without engaging with staff in discussion of
how they had done, and why, and how it might be
improved, was unsatisfactory from their point of view.
This indicates the need to link ‘objective’ assessment
systems with some more participatory forum, in which
collective problem identification and solving can occur.
The whole nature of this particular PBI scheme was
affected by the fact that it was implemented by an
international non-governmental organisation with
external funding, which was therefore able to provide
independent and reliable third party systems for tar-
get-setting and assessment. The scale was also limited
to one district, where the implementing organisation
had strong on-the-ground presence. Where this func-
tion is internalised and scaled up, it will be much
harder to maintain.
Another contextual issue is whether the post-disaster
context of the area in Pakistan facilitated the acceptabil-
ity of PBI. Some have argued that the evidence for effec-
tiveness of PBI approaches is greater in post-conflict
areas [7]] (which share features with post-disaster ones,
in terms of a breakdown of infrastructure, at least, if not
systems). In the case of Bhattagram, the main effect of
emerging from disaster was that outputs were very low
at the start of the project, so that the returns to general
project investments could be commensurately large.
Clearly, it would have been desirable to quantify the
cost-effectiveness of the PBI component in this project.
However, that was not possible, for a number of rea-
sons. First, the project outputs were many and varied–
not easy to assimilate into one index. Secondly, any
gains must be attributed jointly to government and pro-
ject activities (and within the project, to PBI- and non-
PBI elements). Thirdly, secular trends in growth (related
to exogenous factors such as population and economic
growth) must be allowed for in calculating gains. Finally,
to judge the effectiveness of tying pay to performance
requires that we distinguish between the motivational
effects of higher pay per se, versus higher pay which is
conditional on performance. With the data available,
and in the absence of any control areas, these complex
factors could not be adequately addressed.
Conclusions
The review concluded that the SC US project in Batta-
gram had contributed to rebuilding district health ser-
vices. It did so at a cost of less than $4.5 per capita
(combining project and district health expenditure) and
achieved substantial growth in outputs. Staff, managers
and clients were appreciative of the gains in availability
and quality of services.
At the same time, the role that the PBI component
played was less clear–PBI formed a relatively small com-
ponent of pay, and did not increase in line with outputs.
There was little evidence from interviews and data that
the conditional element of the PBIs influenced beha-
viour. They were appreciated as a top-up to pay, but
remained low in relative terms, and only slightly and
indirectly related to individual performance. Moreover,
they were implemented independently of the wider
health system and presented a clear challenge for longer
term integration and sustainability.
The PBI component nevertheless provided useful
learning opportunities. It demonstrated that a transpar-
ent and objective process for measuring performance of
a facility as a whole can be implemented in Pakistan
without causing staff resentment. It demonstrated that a
PBI approach focussed on preventive care can boost
those services without reducing curative visits. It pio-
neered a ‘scorecard’ system which recognised the impor-
tance of process and output indicators. More generally,
it has added to our understanding of how and in what
circumstance PBI can contribute towards health sector
goals.
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